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Case No. 20100632-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellant,
vs.

Jamie Lynn Greenwood,
Defendant/ Appellee.

Brief of Appellant
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant is facing trial on two counts of rape, a first degree felony, in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402 (West Supp. 2010); one count of forcible
sodomy, a first degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (West
Supp. 2010); and one count of forcible sexual abuse, a second degree felony, in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404 (West Supp. 2010). The State petitioned for
review of the trial court's interlocutory order granting defendant's motion to waive
a jury trial without the consent of the prosecution. This Court granted review and
has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(h) (West 2009) (Add. D).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Rule 17(c),

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,

permits a defendant to

waive jury trial in a felony case, but only with the consent of the prosecution and

approval of the court. See Add. A (Rule). Here, the trial court concluded that
enforcing the rule would impinge on defendant's due process rights because: (a) a
criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a bench trial over the objection of the
prosecution; and (b) under the circumstances of this case, the selection of an
impartial jury was impossible or unlikely.
1.

Did the trial court erroneously conclude that a defendant has a

constitutional right to a bench trial over the objection of the prosecution?
Standard of Review. A trial court's determination of constitutionality is
reviewed for correctness on appeal. See State v. Angilau, 2011UT 3, \ 7,245 P.3d 745.
Preservation. The State preserved the issue at R. 114-17 (Add. B) & R139: 7-10,
14-15,17-19,22-23,25, & 29 (Add. C).
2. Did the trial court erroneously conclude that compelling a jury trial in this
case would violate due process because selection of an impartial jury was not
possible or likely?
Standard of Review & Preservation. See Issue I.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following determinative provisions are attached in Addendum A:
U.S. CONST., amend. VI;
UTAHR.CRIM.P. 17.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In March 2010, defendant was charged with one count of rape, two counts of
forcible sodomy, and one count of forcible sexual abuse (R. 1-4). The information
alleged that defendant, who was in her forties, engaged in various sex acts with her
son's teenage friend (id.). After the victim testified at a preliminary hearing,
defendant was bound over for trial (R. 16). A three-day jury trial was scheduled for
August 2010 (R. 22-23).
The morning of the scheduled jury trial, defendant for the first time sought to
waive a jury trial and requested that the trial judge determine the case (R139: 3).
Defendant acknowledged that rule 17(c), UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
permitted jury waiver in a felony case only if the prosecution consented—which it
had not in this case — but claimed that" there are certain circumstances... where...
the Court has the discretion" not to enforce the rule (R139: 20).
Defendant asserted that this case was such a circumstance. She admitted that
she had illegally engaged in sex with the teenage victim, but claimed that based on
his alleged consent and other age-based issues, she might be convicted of some
lesser offense than the offenses charged (R139:5 & 20-21). Defendant explained that
"an analytical and legal pre-trained mind looking and weighing the factors is going
to give her a much more objective decision than trying to, in a short time, explain
and try to articulate to a jury the fine lines between perhaps rape and unlawful
3

sexual activity or unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, and for this reason, she is
choosing to go with the bench as a trier of fact" (R139: 5-6,12-13, & 21). Defendant
opined that the trial judge would "be more objective in looking specifically at the
facts and not weighing out the media and the impression that they may have
already made upon the public down here in the Salt Lake Valley/' but admitted that
no media had attended "the last couple" of hearings (R139: 6).
The prosecutor objected (R139: 7-10,17-19, & 22-23). Citing rule 17(c), the
prosecutor argued that a defendant's waiver of a jury in a felony case could not be
accepted over the prosecution's objection (R. 114-117; R139:7-10,14-15,17-19,22-23,
25 & 29). The prosecutor pointed out that precedent interpreting rule 17(c) and an
identical federal rule had repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of this limitation
(R. 114-17). And although dicta in the leading Supreme Court case recognized that
compelling a defendant to undergo a jury trial might possibly violate due process
"in some circumstances," the Supreme Court and other courts recognized that this
possibility was rare and might occur only if a defendant established that an
impartial jury was impossible or unlikely in a given case (R139: 13-24). The
prosecutor argued that such a circumstance did not exist here, especially given that
potential jurors had not even been questioned (R139: 7-10,17-19, & 22-23).
The prosecutor acknowledged that the charges initially generated some media
attention, but by the time of trial, only one reporter had expressed interest in the
4

case (R139: 9). The prosecutor also noted that if pretrial publicity were a concern,
the defense should have requested a pretrial juror questionnaire as was often done
in high-profile cases (R139: 9-10). In any case, any undue influence that publicity
might have had on an individual juror could be discovered in voir dire and cured
(R139: 22-23). The prosecutor further explained that the State did not oppose
inclusion of a lesser offense instruction, but that this involved only one of the four
charged offenses (R139: 8-9). The prosecutor noted that juries typically consider
consent and other age-determinative issues in sex offense cases and that there was
no basis here to assume that the selected jury could not fairly resolve these issues
(id.).
The trial court disagreed (R139:10-12,13-15, & 23-26; R. 106-07) (Add. B & C).
First, the court was "concerned" that rule 17(c)'s requirement of prosecution consent
unfairly gave the State "the ability to control the case from the standpoint of
whether its going to be tried by the jury or by the Court" (R139:10-11). The court
recognized that rule and precedent allowed such "control," but opined that
compelling a defendant to undergo a jury trial "simply because the State refuses to
give its consent to the waiver" creates a "tremendous burden" on the defense that
implicates due process (R139: 13-14). The court second concluded that the
circumstances of this case mandated a bench trial:

5

The Court is satisfied in this case [of defendant's waiver of jury trial]
because of the nature of the allegations and the prior publicity, along
with the . . . very fine line between offenses charged and the potential
lesser included offenses. The Court believes that it would be a denial
of [defendant's] due process rights to force her to be tried by a jury.
(R139:14).
The court then accepted defendant's waiver of jury trial, excused the jury
pool, and ordered a bench trial to begin the next morning (R139: 14). The court
refused to stay commencement of the bench trial to allow the State time to seek
interlocutory review (R138:4-11). The State petitioned this Court for an emergency
stay and interlocutory review, both of which were granted (R. 121 & 135) (Add. D).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant has not yet been convicted of any crime and the facts are only
alleged. Nevertheless, the allegations are relevant because the trial court concluded
that no jury could fairly determine the facts. See Statement of the Case, supra.
The probable cause statement in the information states that A.B. alleged that
"beginning around March 1, 2009 through January 31, 2009, he had a sexual
relationship with the defendant, Jamie Lynn Greenwood. Throughout the above
time period the defendant would give A.B. gifts and cash and asked to be paid back
with sexual favors. At the same time the defendant would threaten to call A.B/s
mother unless he did as she requested" (R. 3). "The two engaged in sexual
intercourse and had oral sex numerous times at different locations in Salt Lake
6

County. The relationship ended when the defendant and A.B. were discovered as
the defendant forced A.B. to put his finger in her vagina" (id). A.B. was fifteen and
sixteen during the above time period, and the defendant was forty and forty-one.
The defendant was A.B/s friend's mother" (R. 4).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court—as well as the United States Supreme Court—has recognized that
a defendant charged with a felony has no constitutional right to a bench trial.
Consequently, both courts have upheld the constitutionally of reasonable limitations
on a defendant's waiver of jury trial. Specifically, this Court has upheld the
constitutionality of rule 17(c), UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, which requires
that the prosecution consent before a defendant's waiver of jury trial is accepted.
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of
substantively identical rule 23, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
Nevertheless, the trial court refused to enforce rule 17(c) and accepted
defendant's waiver of jury trial over the prosecution's objection. The court ruled
that rule 17(c)'s requirement of prosecution consent impinges on a defendant's
constitutional right to a bench trial. The court further concluded that compelling
this defendant to undergo a jury trial violated due process because selection of an
impartial jury in this case was impossible or unlikely. Although the court had not
yet questioned a single prospective juror, it based its decision on three factors: (1)
7

the case involved sex charges; (2) defendant claimed that the teenage victim
consented; and (3) the case had generated some pretrial publicity. The trial court
erred.
It is well established that compelling a defendant to undergo a jury trial
impinges on no constitutional right. Some dicta in the leading Supreme Court case
acknowledges the possibility that compelling a defendant to undergo a jury trial
might implicate due process, but only in the unusual circumstance where "passion,
prejudice[,or] public feeling" rendered selection of an impartial jury impossible or
unlikely. Numerous cases recognize, however, that this circumstance rarely, if ever,
occurs. Contrary to the trial court's ruling, no such unusual circumstance exists
here and enforcement of rule 17(c) would not have resulted in an unfair trial.
In sum, the trial court's acceptance of defendant's jury waiver should be
reversed and a jury trial ordered.
ARGUMENT
I.
A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT CHARGED WITH A FELONY HAS
NO CONSTITUINAL RIGHT TO A BENCH TRIAL OVER THE
OBJECTION OF THE PROSECUTION; CONSEQUENTLY, THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ENFORCING RULE 17
In Utah, a defendant charged with a felony may waive jury trial only with the
consent of the prosecution:
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All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a
jury in open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the
prosecution.
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 17(c) (Add. A). Rule 17(c) is patterned on a substantively identical
federal rule:
If the defendant is entitled to a jury trial, the trial must be by jury
unless:
(1) the defendant waives a jury trial in writing;
(2) the government consents; and
(3) the court approves.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a) (Add. A). Both rules embrace a criminal defendant's
constitutional right to be tried by a jury. But both state and federal precedent
interpreting these rules recognize that the converse is not true: a defendant has no
constitutional right to a bench trial. See cases cited, below.
In this case, the trial court refused to enforce rule 17(c) and granted
defendant's waiver of jury trial over the objection of the prosecution (R. 106-07)
(Add. B). The court's reasoning was two-fold. The court first concluded that a
defendant has a constitutional right to a bench trial whether or not the prosecution
consents (R. 106). The court second concluded that compelling this defendant to
undergo a jury trial violated due process because no jury could be impartial in this
case (R. 106-07).

9

Both determinations are erroneous. A criminal defendant charged with a
felony has no constitutional right to a bench trial. See discussion, below. And the
circumstances of this case do not establish that an impartial jury was impossible or
unlikely. See Point II. The trial court's order granting defendant's motion to waive
jury trial should be reversed.
***

Over fifty years ago, the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial does not "carry with it the right to
insist upon the opposite of that right." Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-35
(1965). That is, a defendant has no constitutional right to a bench trial. Id. See also
Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 382-83 (1979) (reaffirming Singer's
holding that defendants may not compel "private" bench trials over "public" jury
trials).
This Court has consistently recognized the same principle. See State v.
Robbins, 709 P.2d 771,772 (Utah 1985) (holding that "there is no constitutional right
to a trial by a judge rather than a jury"); State v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5,13 (Utah 1984)
(holding that "neither the state nor the federal constitution guarantees [a defendant]
a right to 'waive' a jury trial); and State v. Studham, 655 P.2d 669,671 (Utah 1982)
(same).
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Consequently, a defendant's waiver of a jury trial— like other constitutional
rights — may be "subjected to reasonable procedural regulations." Singer, 380 U.S. at
at 35. Such reasonable regulation includes conditioning the acceptance of a
defendant's jury waiver upon the consent of the prosecution and the approval of the
court. Id. at 36. See also Robbins, 709 P.2d at 771-72; Davis, 689 P.2d at 12-13; and
Studham, 655 P.2d at 671 (all upholding requirement of prosecution consent).
While such a limitation may compel a defendant to "undergo a jury trial
against his will," it is not "contrary to his right to a fair trial or to due process,"
because "the result is simply that the defendant is subject to an impartial trial by
jury — the very thing that the constitution guarantees him." Singer, 380 U.S. at 36.
Moreover, the government, "as a litigant, has a legitimate interest in seeing that
cases in which it believes a conviction is warranted are tried before the tribunal
which the Constitution regards as most likely to produce a fair result." Id. See also
State v. justice Court, 56 P.3d 5,10; Commonwealth v. Tharp, 754 A.2d. 1251,1253-54
(Perm. 2000) (both upholding legitimacy of state constitutional provisions granting
prosecution same jury trial right as defendant).
Here, the trial court acknowledged rule 17(c)'s requirement of consent and the
precedent upholding that requirement (R139:10-11 & 13; R.106). Nevertheless, the
court refused to enforce rule 17(c) because the court disagreed with the rule's
underlying premise. According to the trial court, compelling a defendant to
11

undergo a jury trial creates a "tremendous burden" that potentially infringes on a
defendant's "due process rights" (R139:13-14; R. 106-07).
No Supreme Court or federal circuit court decision has so held, however. See
United States v. U.S. Dist Court for Eastern Dist. of Calif., 464 F.3d 1065,1070-72 (9th
Cir. 2006) (recognizing that federal appellate decisions have consistently upheld
constitutionality of rule 23's government consent requirement), cert, denied, 551 U.S.
1133 (2007). The Utah Supreme Court—like the majority of state courts —has
likewise concluded that there is no constitutional infringement in requiring the
prosecution's consent for jury waiver. See Robbins, 709 P.2d at 772 (recognizing Utah
has consistently upheld constitutionality of rule 17(c)'s requirement of prosecution
consent for jury waiver); State v. Oakley, 72 P.3d 1114,1120-21 (Wash. App. 2003)
(citing various state authorities upholding requirement of prosecution consent). The
few decisions to the contrary are based on specific state provisions granting a
defendant the unilateral right to control the mode of trial. See id. at 1121 (citing
Oregon and Illinois contrary decisions based on their state constitutional or common
law provisions). Or, one case was based on the defendant's religious belief in a nonjury trial See United States v. Lewis, 638 F.Supp. 573,581 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (ruling
that "sincerely held religious belief against submitting to a jury trial" is protected
under the First Amendment and trumps procedural rule requiring government
consent to jury waiver).
12

The trial court's conclusion here was erroneously based on dicta in Singer
(R139: 10-14; R. 106-107). In Singer, the Supreme Court noted the possibility that
compelling a defendant to undergo a jury trial might result in a due process
violation in the rare circumstance where no impartial jury could be seated:
We need not determine in this case whether there might be some
circumstances where a defendant's reasons for wanting to be tried by a
judge alone are so compelling that the Government's insistence on trial
by jury would result in a denial to a defendant of an impartial trial.
Petitioner argues that there might arise situations where "passion,
prejudice . . . public feeling" or some other factor may render
impossible or unlikely an impartial trial by jury. However, since
petitioner gave no reason for wanting to forgo jury trial other than to
save time, this is not such a case, and petitioner does not claim that it is.
Singer, 380 U.S. at 37-38. In the ensuing years since Singer, no federal appellate court
has ever found such a case to actually exist. See U.S. Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of
Calif, 464 F.3d at 1070-71 (recognizing that neither Supreme Court nor federal circuit
courts have found "circumstances alluded to in Singer actually existed"). But see
United States v. Clark, 943 F.2d 775,784 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that a defendant has
no constitutional right to bench trial, but recognizing two federal district court cases
from 1970's that allowed jury waiver over government objection due to complexity
of trying "multiple defendants" on "multiple medicaid, medicare and tax fraud"
charges), cert, denied, 509 U.S. 926 (1993). Utah likewise has never found such a case
to actually exist. Cf Robbins, 709 P.2d at 772.

13

Moreover, decisions discussing Singer's dicta recognize that not being able to
impanel an impartial jury is only a remote possibility given the "abundance of
tools'7 trial courts have to ensure a fair trial. For example, courts may order pretrial
jury questionnaires; they may conduct more extensive voir dire; they may grant
additional jury strikes; they may limit admission of unduly prejudicial evidence; or
they may continue a trial to allow any adverse impact of pretrial publicity to
diminish. See UTAH R. CRIM. P. 18 (governing selection of jury); UTAH R. EVID. 403
(permitting relevant, but unduly prejudicial information to be excluded). See also
U.S. Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of Calif., 464 F.3d at 1071 (recognizing that jury
questionnaires, individual voir dire, jury instructions, and limitations on admission
of unduly prejudicial evidence minimize possibility of inflaming or biasing jury);
United States v. Daniels, 282 F.Supp. 360, 361 (N.D. 111. 1968) (recognizing that trial
continuance after media coverage had ended likely would reduce adverse effect of
pretrial publicity on potential jurors). Tnus, while the possibility of a due process
violation may exist in some rare case, this possibility does not negate the general
legitimacy of waiver-limitation rules. Rather, recognition of such a possibility
acknowledges only a truism: a defendant may prove a denial of due process if he
establishes that his trial was unfair.

14

In sum, the trial court erred in concluding that a defendant charged with a
felony has a constitutional right to a bench trial over the objection of the
prosecution. As a result, the trial court erred in not enforcing rule 17(c).
II.
SELECTION OF AN IMPARTIAL JURY WAS NOT IMPOSSIBLE
OR UNLIKELY IN THIS CASE; CONSEQUENTLY, THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN NOT ENFORCING RULE 17
The trial court also erroneously concluded that enforcement of rule 17(c) in
this case would necessarily result in an unfair trial because selection of an impartial
jury was impossible or unlikely (R139:10-14; R. 106-07).
After the court concluded that rule 17(c)'s requirement of prosecution consent
could not constitutionally be required in all cases, the court considered the rule's
application to the facts of this case (R139:14; R. 106-07). The court concluded that
three circumstances established the impossibility of a fair trial if defendant were
compelled to undergo a jury trial: (1) the case involved sex offenses; (2) a "close
line" existed between the charged offenses and any lesser offense based on consent
and the victim's age; and (3) there had been some pretrial publicity (id.). None of
these circumstances, however, establishes that a jury trial would be unfair.
As discussed, the trial court relied on Singe/s dicta in concluding that
enforcement of rule 17(c) in all cases would be unconstitutional. The trial court
relied on the same dicta in concluding that enforcement of the rule in this case
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would result in an unfair trial (R. 13-14; R. 106-07). But as discussed, very few cases
have reached a similar conclusion based on the facts of a given case. See cases, supra,
at 13.
The trial court first concluded that the sexual nature of the charges established
that no jury hearing the case could be impartial (R. 13; R. 106). That conclusion is
erroneous. The fact that sex crimes are involved does not affect the applicability of
rule 17(c) or its constitutional preference for jury trial. See Robbins, 709 P.2d at 77172 (compelling jury trial in child sex abuse case did not violate due process). See also
U.S. Dist. Court for the Eastern Dist. of Calif., 464 F.3d at 1067 & 1071-72 (compelling
defendants to face jury trial in "horrific" case involving "ten yeairs of ritualistic
sexual abuse" and five children did not violate due process). Moreover, juries
comply resolve sex crime allegations — including allegations involving issues of
consent and minors. See, e.g., State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, 243 P.3d 1250 (reversing
based on erroneous jury instructions and remanding for new jury trial of
polygamous religious leader charged with rape as an accomplice based on
performance of underage "marriage"); State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, 137 P.3d 726
(upholding jury convictions for bigamy and unlawful sexual conduct with minor
arising from polygamous underage "marriage"); State v. Taylor, 2005 UT 40,116 P.3d
360 (upholding jury instructions on consent and affirming convictions for rape of a
child and sodomy on a child).
16

The trial court next concluded that no jury could fairly resolve the "close line"
between the charged offenses and any lesser offense based on consent and other
age-determinative issues (R. 13-14; R. 106-07). But again, juries typically resolve
such issues. See cases cited, above. And, in any event, a defense of consent in a case
involving adult sex with a minor is statutorily limited. See State v. Martinez, 2002 UT
80, If 18, 52 P.3d 1276; State v. Christensen, 2001 UT 14, 1 8, 20 P.3d 329 (both
recognizing legislative policy of enacting laws that protect minors from sex with
adult regardless of minor's willingness to participate in offense).
The trial court also concluded that no impartial jury could be selected in this
case because some pretrial publicity had occurred (R. 13-14; R. 106-07). While it is
undisputed that some publicity occurred initially (R139: 9), the record does not
establish to what extent this publicity continued over the ensuing months.
Moreover, defense counsel admitted that no members of the media had even
attended the "last couple" of hearings before the scheduled trial (R139: 6).
In any case, the mere fact that some pretrial publicity occurred does not
establish that all the potential jurors were exposed to that publicity or that any of the
potential jurors were biased. See State v. James, 767 P.2d 549, 555 (Utah 1989)
(recognizing that "[j]urors are commonly seated to hear felony trials after . . .
[having heard] prejudicial information about the defendant and perhaps even
having formulated some opinion as to guilt," if they fairly represent that "they
17

would be able to set aside any preconceived notions and decide the case on the
evidence presented at triar). Nor can the record establish that any of the potential
jurors in this case were partial or otherwise incapable of fairly deciding the case
where none was even questioned before the trial court ruled. See State v. Widdison,
2001 UT 60, f f 35-39, 28 R3d 1278 (recognizing that despite extensive pretrial
publicity in small community, ultimate impartiality of jury established through jury
questionnaires and jury voir dire).
In sum, the trial court's presumption that no impartial jury was possible or
likely in this case is not supportable by the record. Consequently, the court erred in
concluding that enforcement of rule 17(c) would necessarily result in defendant
being deprived of a fair trial.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's "Decision on Defendant's Motion
to Waive Trial by Jury" should be reversed and jury trial ordered.
Respectfully submitted April 7th, 2011.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney<?eheral

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellant
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.

Utah R. Crim. P. 17 - The Trial
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial with the
following exceptions:
(a)(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may consent
in writing to trial in his absence;
(a)(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial
shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present; and
(a)(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause
shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal
attendance of the defendant at the trial
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order:
(b)(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody;
(b)(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody;
(b)(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and
(b)(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance.
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury in
open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution.

(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes
written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise. No
jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction.
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified in
Section 78-46-5, U.C. A. 1953.
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the accused
and the approval of the court, by stipulation in writing or made orally in open
court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in progress with any number of
jurors less than otherwise required.
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in the
following order:
(g)(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated;
(g)(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement amd the defense
may make an opening statement or reserve it until the prosecution has rested;
(g)(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge;
(g)(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case;
(g)(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court,
for good cause, otherwise permits;
(g)(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the
court shall instruct the jury; and
(g)(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides
without argument, the prosecution shall open the argument, the defense shall
follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense argument.

The court may set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for each party
and the time to be allowed for argument.
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an alternate
juror has been selected, the case shall proceed using the alternate juror. If no
alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed with the number
of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged and a new trial
ordered.
(i) Questions by jurors. A judge may invite jurors to submit written questions to
a witness as provided in this section.
(i)(l) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge shall control the
process to ensure the jury maintains its role as the impartial finder of fact and
does not become an investigative body. The judge may disallow any question
from a juror and may discontinue questions from jurors at any time.
(i)(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge should advise the
jurors that they may write the question as it occurs to them and submit the
question to the bailiff for transmittal to the judge. The judge should advise the
jurors that some questions might not be allowed.
(i)(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and unrepresented parties
and rule upon any objection to the question. The judge may disallow a question
even though no objection is made. The judge shall preserve the written question
in the court file. If the question is allowed, the judge shall ask the question or
permit counsel or an unrepresented party to ask it. The question may be
rephrased into proper form. The judge shall allow counsel and unrepresented
parties to examine the witness after the juror's question.
(j) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or in which any other
material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the
charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some person
appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall be sworn that while the
jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person so

appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected with
the trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay or at a specified
time.
(k) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate or are
sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to
converse among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to be
addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their duty
not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally submitted to
them.
(1) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instructions of
the court and all exhibits which have been received as evidence, except exhibits
that should not, in the opinion of the court, be in the possession of the jury, such
as exhibits of unusual size, weapons or contraband. The court shall permit the
jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are entitled to take notes during the
trial and to have those notes with them during deliberations. As necessary, the
court shall provide jurors with writing materials and instruct the jury on taking
and using notes.
(m) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together in
some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree upon a verdict
or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by order of the
court, the officer having them under his charge shall not allow any
communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask them if
they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is
rendered, communicate to any person the state of their deliberations or the
verdict agreed upon.
(n) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed on any
point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge of them,
who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then direct that
the jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the defendant and
both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the jury that no
further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be recorded. The court
may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing without having the jury
brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and the response thereto shall

be entered in the record.
(o) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be corrected by
the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out again.
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of
all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or
indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not legally
sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense.

Federal R. Crim. P. 23 - Jury or Nonjury Trial
(a) Jury Trial. If the defendant is entitled to a jury trial, the trial must be by jury unless:
(1) the defendant waives a jury trial in writing;
(2) the government consents; and
(3) the court approves.
(b) Jury Size.
(1) In General. A jury consists of 12 persons unless this rule provides otherwise.
(2) Stipulation for a Smaller Jury. At any time before the verdict, the parties may, with
the court's approval, stipulate in writing that:
(A) the jury may consist of fewer than 12 persons; or
(B) a jury of fewer than 12 persons may return a verdict if the court finds it necessary to
excuse a juror for good cause after the trial begins.
(3) Court Order for a Jury of 11. After the jury has retired to deliberate, the court may
permit a jury of 11 persons to return a verdict, even without a stipulation by the parties,
if the court finds good cause to excuse a juror.
(c) Nonjury Trial. In a case tried without a jury, the court must find the defendant
guilty or not guilty. If a party requests before the finding of guilty or not guilty, the
court must state its specific findings of fact in open court or in a written decision or
opinion.
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I III rilliliI IIID1CIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEST J O R D A i y ) E M R T M E ! ^
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH WJEST JORDAN \Jzr

v r E O F U T A H >

Plaintiff,

*
*

v.

*
*
*

DECISION ON DEFEND \h
MOTION TO WAIVE
TRIAL BY JUR\

JAMIE GREENWOOD,
Defendant

*
*

Case No.: 101400544
Honorable Robert W vdkins

THIS MATTER came before the Court pnoi to the beginning of the jur} selection
process in the trial of the abcw e-captioned matter. Defense counsel on behalf of Defendant,
ui n ed u wai\ v Ilk |UP in tln( mattci and to piOLixd with a luidi In il The State obKttt j to
the wancr ot a )iir> pursuant to Rule I u i w] the I tah Rules ot luminal Proceduic
The Court, after having re\ icwed the applicable case law in this area, requested Defense
Counsel to state on the record the basis for the motion After leceh nig the basis for the motion
and the State's argument in objection thereto, thi* Court hereb\ make5- the following ruling
1.

I hi" < ourt undtiwtand Pule 1 ~V) nl the I 'lah Rule*" ni < nnun ii Pioieduie and Ihc u s e
Ian applicable to the matter at hand The Court behe\ es that upon a proper show mg a
defendant should be able to waive his or her right to a jun trial

I o allow the State in

every case 10 defeat this abiiin would place a tremendous burden upon a Defendant and a
tiiniendous amount ol power in the lianas ol the State Flit State although iepi renting
the people 3^ not -ubud 1n the lo^ oi nherr as b a defendant
2

I lnc court behe\es that ii a defendant can make a showing upon a proper basis why a
defendant desires to waive a jun. thiib Court belie\ es that b> denying such reque »t simph
at the objection of the State would implicate the due piocess rights of the Defendant.

3.

The Court is satisfied that Defendant has met t « buidcn because of the natuie ol the t ase,
ih * publkii\ this tasa ha- jx,ei\ad and the Ink una hJwcui the offenses chaigad and
lesser included offenses w men tiie court has agreed to consider. In the Supreme Couit

OO00106

decision of Singer v United States, the Supreme Court stated, "we need not determine m
this case whether there might be some circumstances where a defendant's reasons for
wanting to be tried by a judge alone are so compelling that the Government's insistence
on a trial by jury would result in the denial to a defendant of an impartial trial." This
Court believes that the cumulative impact of the factors stated above creates such an
unusual circumstance.
4.

This Court finds that it would be a denial of Defendant's due process rights to refuse to
honor Defendant's request to waive a jury trial. Therefore, Defendant's motion is hereby
granted.

DATED this /

day of August, 2010.
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of Hearing

August 4, 2 010
PROCEEDINGS
BAILIFF:

Sorry,

Your Honor.

Arrington, I think, just walked to the
THE COURT:

That's fine.

Mr.

restroom.

It took me a

little longer than I anticipated.

Alright, we're

on the record in the case of State

of

Jamie

Lynn

Greenwood.

It's

Case

Utah

v.

010400544.

Counsel will state their appearances, please.
MR. ARRINGTON:
representing

Mark Arrington

Jamie Greenwood, co-counsel with

Jim

Retallick.
THE COURT:
MS.

Alright, and for the

CRANDALL:

State?

Kim Crandall and Marc

Mathis for the State, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
is present.
panel.

defendant

We're outside the presence of the

I did have an in chambers meeting with

counsel ihis morning.
Ms.

Alright, and the

Mr. Arrington indicated

Greenwood wanted to waive her right: to be

jury
all
that
tried

by jury, and I was informed the State objected

to

that.

Mr.

So I wanted to put that on the record.

Arrington, I'll hear from you.
MR. ARRINGTON:

THACKERiCO
ThackerCo.com
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discussing

a n ci w e i g h :i n g

the

few

c]ien t
wee k s

numerous

avenues

t i" e p a r t i c u ] a r s o f

: a s e ,. m y c 1 i e n t w a n t s t o p 1 a c e h e r c o n f i d e n c e
vrust

in having

wishes

a bench

t ri a 1 a t t h i s

•' ~ t h a t a c c u r a t e ?

getting
looked

GREENWOOD:

THE

C0UF T :

too far into

waiver

reason

from

.

•

•

clear,

•

Your

constitutional
from

G i e e n w c c• d ,

S li r .

An d M r . A r r i n g t o n ,
the specifics

to kncw

y o u , Mr

without

o f i t , If

e

in th i s are a a n d a l s o

the reason

•

to grant

I rrington.

of i t , b u t just

Ms. Greenwood

MR.

chosen

need

the facts

that

cf a 'jury.

y o u w o u 1 d 1- i k e t. o

Yes ,

if I'm goi ng to be able

into

a. n d

T h e C c u i: I: , I b e ] i e \ e , t o m a k e a

would

' ]1 hear

it

what

at a fe w of t h e c a s e s

decision,

- u r y

Is that

this.

a nd

1 3 i " i g h 1: , a n d: M s

MS.

. 3: i. e i u J e ,

get

time,

t o w a i v e t h e o p ti o n o r t h e ri g ht
T H E (I! C • U F T i

cver

wants

behind

that

it, an d

I don't

want

generally,

to waive

to

the

a trial

by

•

ARRINGTO N
Honor,
right

a n d just

she understands
to choose

the community.

THACKERiCO
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a jury

make

she h a s the
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I've explained
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She feels that, first of all, to

say nothing of judicial comity and so forth, that
her faith and her belief about getting a fair

and

reasonable and objective trier of fact at this
point and under the circumstances of this case

lies

greater with a bench trial, rather than a jury

and

believes that the legal analysis that's going to be
applied specifically to this case, the argument
not if illegal circumstances happened.

is

She

cooperated with authorities on this and gave
admissions.

The question that this whole

case

surrounds is a question of consent, and reviewing
the law with my client, believes that there is a
relatively fine line between — in issues of consent.
If there
circumstances

is consent

under

the

and the facts of the case between

the

victim and my client, then there are lesser
included offenses than what she is charged with.
We believe that having an analytical and legal pretrained mind looking and weighing the factors

is

going to give her a much more objective; decision
than trying to, in a very short time, explain
try to articulate to a jury the fine lines

and

between

perhaps rape and unlawful sexual activity or
unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, and for

THACKERiC
ThackerCo.com
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upon

and
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down
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quite

and as

I will
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tell
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dealing

I do believe

that

if the matter were tried by a jury, that a court,
at this point, preliminarily at least, would be
inclined to submit some lesser and included
offenses, and I don't know whether based on that,
that would change Ms. Greenwood's decision on
requesting the waiver of the jury.
MR. ARRINGTON:

It would not, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Alright.

Mr. Arrington, is

there anything further at this time?
MR. ARRINGTON:

I would submit it on

those arguments, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
MS.

Alright, and Ms. Crandall?

CRANDALL:

Your Honor, this morning

is the first we've even heard it.

I understand

he's been in discussion for the last couple of
weeks about it, but this is the first the State
ever even heard of this.

When we had the pretrial

last week, it never came up about her possibly
waiving the jury trial.
Rule

17(c),

Procedure, is clear.

under the Rules
It says all felony

of

cases

shall be tried by jury unless the defenaant

THACKERzCO
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T his is a c a s e
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to t h e
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-- : a 1

a r g u m e n t s , b u t t h a t '" s w i : a 1: w e '" r e h e r e : . :
here

t o explain

a nd i n s t r u c t

to the jury

them

what

needs

to

happen
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: e

have
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the ones

g o i 1 2 g :: o i 1 a v ' €
and

then

THACKERiCi
ThackerCo.com

probably

the facts

and I

o n and can h a n d

and C o u n s e l ,
They

the

t h a t h a v e .been

a few v a r i a t i o n s ,

t o You.r H o n o r

1 think

are

I'll w o r k

are a 1 ittle b i t - -

here

process.

by M r . A r r i n g t o n

appropriate,

11 • s j u s t
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we're
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As
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t h e voir

that
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through

they
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to go t h r o u g h

after
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I think
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support a finding that only one offense

happened

when he was 16, the rest would have been when he
was 15.

So I think, just as far as the lesser

included, we maybe need to re-work those so
have some I'll
lesser

submit.

I'll

We're not objecting to the

included.
And

I think

the Jury--juries

all

time find guilty if they are going to find
on a lesser included, they do.

the

guilty

It's a disservice

to them to say that they are unable to do that

and

understand the law.
THE COURT:

Mr. Crandall, Mr. Arrington

indicated that the DA's office has indicated
this is a public interest, high profile

that

case.

Do

you have any comment on that?
MS.

CRANDALL:

Well, I think tha: that,

as Mr. Arrington said, yes.
interest in it.
Hunt at The

I received a phone call from

Tribune

going torward.

There has been media
Steve

yesterday wondering if it was

We're not denying t n a t , but

that

shouldn't be a deciding factor over whether or not
it's a ]udge or a bench trial, or a bench trial or
a jury trial.

If that was a concern, then, as I

said, that needed to be addressed through a jury
questionnaire process which, you know, we do jury

THACKERCO
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a t zhi s p o i n t

t hat

it

s h o u I d b e a b e n e h t r i a 1 , a n d T d : i i'" t h a v e i t i n
front

o f m e r i g h t n o w , b u t I !-::. ::- v; t h e r e ' s

S up reme

Court

case

1 aw on t h i s

issue

Utah

an d i f y o u a r e

:i r ,
. c 1 i n e :i t o 1 c D 1 ;: a t t i i a t , :i f \ : i i g i , e i i s
w e can run downstairs

and get a motion

to

s o in e

that

effect.
'THE C O U R T :
v,

Serpent,

S-E-R

o f the Utah

Court

of A p p e a l s .

at

State'

Ms. Crandall,

S tate
Utah
of

of

Utah

Supreme

Utah

v.

Supreme
cases

v.

Court,

Davis,

i n di c a t e

case,

1:1 i a t ,

but with

t hat
faces
a

that

r ight
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case
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that

said,

she's
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entitled to generally waive that right to a jury.
The Court

is concerned

that

the

defendant, in order to waive that right;, has

to

have the consent of both the Court and the
prosecution, and if the Court were inclined to

give

its consent and the State did not in this case, it
seems to this Court that it really places a
tremendous control over the action in the hands of
the prosecution when the prosecution and the

Court

understands that the prosecution is representing
the State, but the State is not the one that's
subject to a loss of liberty, and the Court is
concerned about the State having the ability

to

control the case from the standpoint of whether
it's going to be tried by the jury or fcy the
Court .
I will

indicate

to all parties

that I

would prefer the jury making that decision

rather

than the Court, and I should indicate, Ms.
Greenwood, that before you could be convicted,

ail

eight members of the jury would have to unanimously
agree that you were guilty of each and every

charge

alleged and, ma'am, do you understand the
difference between the jury trial and t he bench
trial that with a jury trial, all eight members of

THACKERiCO
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r. e t he

have

to

agree

one

P. r r i n g t o n

if

you

sure

Ms.Greenwood
MR.

Court,

Your

least

lately
spent

COURT:

tne

would

once

every

with

of

have

two

to

hoping

would

there

be

her

find

whether

must

so

in s te ad

cf

ask

would

Mr.
make

that.

-.hark

y: :: .

discussion)
If

I may

address

the

and

be

one,

it

be

s t he

this,

weeks
the

she

one

THACKERCO

you

to

ten

last

few

or

in

favor

and
that

eight
of

her

even

weeks

understand
all

included

visited

days

that

charges

jurors

the

f i 1 e ci o r w e ' r e
offenses.

decision

strong

I ha v e

I have

does

jury,

unanimous

even

ThackerCo.com

to

unanimously

lesser

by

please.
Thank

days

a unanimous

State,

those

c >f

a in o m e n t a n ci j i :: s t

Y^z,

Yes,

prior

every'several

luea

a

finder

State

understands

ARRINGTON:

to her

time

with

one

C o u r t , and
the

the

Honor?

-•MR.

at

of

but

be

I would

ARRINGTON:

THE

explained

and

ARRINGTON;

MR.

o n1y

people,

won 1 d t a ke

(Inaudible

guilty

charged,

w c u1d

eight

that

were

offenses

convince

only

to

that

hold

and
out

,J West Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
01-983-2180 | 877-441-2180
Fax: 801-983-2181

Even

that
out

of

should
eight

jurors
hung

that

jury.

Transcript of Hearing

08/04/10

would

we

She

circumstances,
State

would

basically,
with

She

does
if

have

still

and

the b e n c h

lies

anything

were

option

with

of

that

re-trying

her,

fate w o u l d
tat

that

that

should

lie

in

being

this

between

the

she

go

the
Court.

she b e l i e v e s

option

the

from

and

a

the
jury

her

COURT:

further

a hung

trial

strongly

end up w i t h

under

new

fairness

THE

that

individual,

feels

objective

know

the

that

of one

budge, then

there

a whole

a bench,

decision

not

13

the

the
jury
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Alright,

either

and

is

there

counsel?

MR. A R R 1 N G T O N :

We w o u l d

submit,

THE

COURT:

Crandall?

MS.

CRANDALL:

Your

Honor.

State

has made

COURT:

conflicting

interests

u n Q sr s usn u s

un e

have

come

down;

that

that

in

their

believes
defendant

that

N o , Your

its p o s i t i o n

THE

waiving

Ms.

The
and

r u J. e ,

every
right
upon

should

be
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between
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we're

to even

together

If

we
going

look

within

at
ten

minutes?
THE

COURT:

will

certainly

this

p o i n t , but

would

like

to

If you want

consider

it, you

if t h e r e ' s

submit

opportunity
you

to do

so.

from p r e s e n t i n g

regarding
motion

if you want
that

the

something

I'll

because

state

ten m i n u t e s , w e ' l l

at

you

an

to

you

to the

I am

that

foreclose
want

it is a v e r y

and

I

Court

you

want

that

^here
else

the

give

I don't

anything

the m o t i o n

to b o t h

know,

to c o n v i n c e

otherwise, Ms. Crandall,

to do t h a t ,

important

defendant.

recess

and

So

give

you

opportunity.
MS.

CRANDALL:

Okay,

thank

you,

Your

you,

^our

Honor.

Honor .
MR. A R R I N G T O N :

Thank

(Recess)
THE
the
of

record.
State

of
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COURT:

We're
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before the recess, juror number 51 is Dr. Brown. He
has surgery scheduled at noon.

Unless there is

some objection, I would like to excuse him now.

Is

there any objection to the excusing Dr. Brown at
this time from the State?
MS.

CRANDALL:

THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.

From the

defendant?

MR. RETALLICK:

No, Your Honor.

MR. ARRINGTON:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Alright-, Casey, if you would

let Dr. Brown know that he is excused.

I've

also

now received the State's objection to waiver of the
jury trial and memorandum in support thereof.

I

will indicate to counsel that I misspelled, when I
indicated that I read cases, the case that was not
applicable was Case

v.

Serpent.

That is not

applicable, and that was included in all of the
ones that I read, but that has no application to
this issue, and I'll hear from the State, but I
will tell the State that I've

seen that motion

because it appears to be very similar to State
Fagness,

v.

and I had the benefit of that file.

That's where I got those earlier cases.
MR. MATHIS:

Sc—

And, Your Honor, we

do

have copies of the case law that is cited in that

THACKERzCO
ThackerCo.com
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motion if you've had an opportunity to read.
THE COURT:

If you would like to argue

that, I'll hear from you, Mr. Mathis.
MR. MATHIS:

Well,

I just have

copies

for the Court before proceeding.
THE COURT:

Oh, alright.

Thank you.

Alright, and I had previously seen Davis
Robbins
Black

.

and

If you would give me a moment: to look at
Singer.

and

MR. MATHIS:

Your Honor, I believe

the State did submit those, the Studhain
attached to the Robbins

that

case is

case, and that'' s stapled

separately.
THE COURT:

Alright, alright, thank

Alright, I'll hear from the State, Mr. Mathis
Ms.

you.
or

Crandall?
MR. MATHIS:

to echo the earlier

Your

Honor, I think,

argument that the plain

of the Rule 17(c) clearly does indicate that

just

reading
in

oiQsr ror a Qcicnusni to waive or ior "cnere 10 .u e
a waiver of a jury trial, that three things need to
happen:

(1) that the defendant requests it,

that the Court approves it, and

(2)

(3) that the

State

was brought

up

gives its consent.
This

identical

THACKER+CO
ThackerCo.com

issue
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Court

which is another Utah
Studham,

additionally

Supreme Court case, and Singer

v.

a Utah

States,

a

In all the

Utah

Supreme Court cases, judge, the Supreme Court

held

United States Supreme Court case.

United

Supreme

that it is a meritless argument to say that it is
an unconstitutional

rule that they have violated

due process by denying the waiver of a jury trial.
I don't

know that--I

have not heard

authority that the defendant has cited that

would,

could even come close to circumventing these

cases

or give a separate rationale to say that we're
making that same argument.

They're making

any

not

the

identical argument and this--I believe that

the

Supreme Court is saying that it is a meritless
claim because it is well settled law.
I think

the plain

language

of the

rule

which is accepted by the Utah Supreme Court, plus
the Utah Supreme Court rulings in all the
aforementioned

cases and the holding in the U.S.

Supreme Court case clearly states that the
Constitution's

guarantee of a fair trial gives a

defendant a right to safeguard themselves

against

possible jury prejudice by insisting on trial

THACKERCO
ThackerCo.com
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before the judge alone. That is not the

argument

that's necessarily being made today.
In light

of the Constitution

emphasis

on

a jury trial, we find it difficult to understand
how the petitioner

could submit the bald

proposition that to compel the defendant in a
criminal case to undergo a jury trial against

his

will is contrary to the right to a fair trial or
due process.

There is no constitutional

to a conditioning

impediment

a waiver of this right on the

consent of the prosecuting

attorney and the

trial

judge when, if either refuses to consent, the
result is simply that the defendant is subject to
an impartial trial by the jury, the very thing
the Constitution guarantees
That's

that

them.

what we're

dealing

with

today,

Judge, and I think that it's very well settled

law

that there is no defendant right to waive a jury
trial in the absence of consent of the State.
1 f l JU

^

w VJ I \

J. .

h i

I

1 y

n

I

f

UXXCLUK

Arrington or Mr. Retallick, anything
MR. RETALLICK:
it's difficult.

Well,

y w u. .

i\. -L.

.

farther?

Your Honor,

We're at a disadvantage.

We

don't

have an office with law clerks that can run down in
the extended ten minute break and write up a brief

THACKER+CO
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in this matter, Your Honor, but we do maintain
some of the cases that's cited indicate that

that

there

are certain circumstances where this right to a
jury may be waived in some instances and the

Court

has the discretion which the Court exercised

here.

I just don't have the time and I don't know if Mr.
Arrington has anything to add to provide

further

legal analysis to this because, as I say, we've
just received these cases and we're going

through

them right n ow.
MR. ARRINGTON:

Just to echo, Your

Honor, just that the way the law is written here in
Utah, and under which-- a 1 though there's

similar

cases, I don't know that they're identical as far
as the charges are concerned.

There is a legal

fine line between the charges that have been--in
fact, if I can go back for a moment.

She was

originally booked on charges that we've asked

for

jury instructions of the lesser included offenses.
The State, upon reviewing the information and

the

discovery submitted by the police department,
amends the charges ro include the rape, the

first

degree felonies.
There

is a fine line

in between

the

charges filed and the charges she was arrested

THACKERvCO
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and what we're asking for if this goes to a jury,
to the lesser included offenses.

It boils down to

an issue of consent, and there is jury

instructions

that have been submitted by the State that

we're

going to, at least when it comes to that, take
issue as to defining coercion, enticement, those
kinds of things and have brought case law to back
that up .
The point being

is that

there — it's

going to take, whether it's a bench trial or a jury
trial, fine hair analysis and coming down to an
issue of factual v. legal consent in this case, and
reiterating that my client is, although it would
rest with a single individual, that being
Court, to decide her fate.

She is more

this

comfortable

because we go to deliberation with a legal mind
versus the jury who, in all likelihood, have no
understanding of the details and the fine

analysis

between rape and unlawful sexual intercourse

and

unlawful sexual conauct involving a minor, and I
don't know that they are going to be, although we
do normally rely on Americans to be intelligent

and

objective in our daily dealings, I don't know that
they are going to be able to completely

understand

the gravamen in the short time we have in giving

THACKER+CO
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and for them weighing

objectively, again, with the media attention
has been present on this case.
THE COURT:

that

I submit.

Alright, Mr. Mathis?

MR. MATHIS:

Judge,

first

I would

to respond to the issue that was raised that

like
the

defense is not given the same advantage as we have.
I can assure you, we also do not have law clerks
that do this research for us.
our own, number one.

We have to do it on

Number two, given the

defendant's own admission, this is something
they've been talking about for months.

that

So to say

that this is an unanticipated argument, I think, is
unpersuasive to me and I believe to be unpersuasive
to the Court.
Given

also the arguments

given

by

defendant today, his claim is that he is afraid
that the, or that he believes that the Court

will

be more fair and objective than the jury who

hasn't

even been, we haven't even gone through the

voir

dire

process.

the

voir

dire

So without even going through

process, Your Honor, I think that

puts the burden on the Court, if the Court

that
stays

with its original ruling, to make the finding
the jury pool, as assembled today, is unfair

THACKERtCO
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I do
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analysis
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today,

I mean,
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been

haven't

than
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today,

unpersuasive.
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jury
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situations where passion, prejudice, public
or some other factor may render impossible

feeling
or

unlikely by an impartial trial by jury; however,
since petitioner gave no reason for wanting

to

forego jury trial, other than to save time, this is
not such a case and the petitioner does not

claim

that it is.
I think

the Supreme

Court

Singer

m

leaves open, as an exception to that general
which the Court recognizes that that is the

rule
general

rule, but I think, based on what has been
presented, the reasons why the defendant wants to
waive a jury in this case, because of the nature of
the allegations, because of the publicity,
of the lesser included offenses that the

because

cumulative

impact of those factors seem, to this Court, to
require that the Court grant the motion, that the
State cannot, in every case, prevent the
defendant's waiver, and it's m

the unusual

case

t n a t the State — only 1 n the unusual case is there a
waiver of the right would be granted, and I think
this is the unusual case.
Tne Court believes

that to not

waive

the--not allow the defendant to waive a jury

trial

implicates her due process rights and for those

THACKER4€O
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Honor
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been married
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would
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want

doing

to

be

two h u n d r e d

for

and
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was

felony
was

set

bail.

it as first

same

is

born
house

ten

which
The

amended

degree

of five

She's

at

felonies,

that

sne

charges.

hundred

4 2 years

old.

arid r a i s e d
for

13

in

years.

20 y e a r s .

able

fifty

Honor,

information,

though

in the

were

degree

the

record.

She

bail

on b a i l

even

Utah.

degree

jail,

got

Your

client

she p a i d

was b o o k e d

We

is my

re-filed

aollars,

Well,

third

h i g h , but

the

She

the

for

information,

tnousand
She

you

be p l a n n i n g

does

on t h i r d

into

dollars

got

felony.

did

this.

And

concern

arrested

is a l i t t l e

the

our

booked

thousand

State

excuse

that?

that

She was

Honor,

If Your

MR. A R R I N G T O N :
granted

I will

testimony?

CRANDALL:

won't

on

granted.

and, M s . C r a n d a l l , w h e n

MS.

heard

is
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to
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that is way above anything that she or her
combined to come up with.

family

Understanding that

the

interlocutory appeal is going to take some time,
she has been a model prisoner.
in as a trustee during her stay.
custody for five months.
ups or anything.

She has even

been

She's been

in

There have been no write-

I think it would be appropriate

to re-visit her custody status and either allow her
O.R., because she has paid a bail in this matter on
charges that would be lesser included offenses, or
at least place her on home confinement

pre-trial

services where she is being constantly

supervised.

It is available down here, or at least lower

that

bail down to something that's much more reasonable.
Again, any pre-trial
would be satisfactory
THE COURT:

services, home

confinement

for us.
Alright, anything

further

from the State ?
MS.
we're

clear

CRANDALL:

Yes, Your Honor, just so

'ue r e was never an amen:

information.

The defendant was booked on probable

cause by police officers, by Sandy police, and
that's what she was booked on.

That's what

she

bonded out on.
The State, once they

THACKERiC
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and actually filed an information, we requested

two

hundred and fifty thousand, at which time, when I
believe it was Judge Coriss at the time, saw
information, he raised it to five hundred
We already

had a bond

March in front of Judge Kelly.

hearing

thousand.
back

in

At that point, it

was lowered to the two hundred and fifty

thousand.

He said if she bailed out, ordered

pre-trial

services after forty-eight hours.

We've

had that hearing.

the

already

I don't think what has happened

here today really changes that in any material
manner, and the victim has a right, if you are
inclined to grant for some reason, even though
there's no legal basis to do so, another bond
hearing, and we have the right to have the victim
present, at least speak to him and get some

input

f r om him.
MR. ARRINGTON:

And we would

stipulate

to a bond hearing, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

And Mr. Arringion and Mr.

Retallick, what is the defendant's position
proceeding with the trial.

on not

The State, apparently,

is going to take an interlocutory appeal, and
whether or not that will be granted, the Court
anticipated that we would go ahead and proceed

THACKERiCO
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the trial.
MR. ARRINGTON:
interlocutory

Well, I think the

appeal has been availed just because

it requires a disposition, I think.

We're

objecting to--we would like to go forward with the
trial today and proceed.

The interlocutory

is going to take some time.

appeal

It's going to involve

other counsel, lots of legal argument and
preparation
of.

I think that this Court is well

aware

We would like to proceed with trial today.
MR. RETALLICK:

Your Honor, if I may,

just one additional point on the
appeal.

interlocutory

I've been involved in many of them and one

of the keys to the interlocutory appeal is that the
issue that is sought to be decided by the Court of
Appeals must be--have some dispositive
the case before the Court.

impact on

It's not dispositive.

The only decision would be to reverse you and say
we should have a jury.

Having a jury or not

having a jury is noi going to be dispositive

of the

underlying charges.
Typical

interlocutory

appeal

is on a

suppression issue where the district court — someone
claims the district court made an error.
evidence--if the denial of the suppression

THACKER+CO
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is reversed, the evidence is allowed in, then

that

becomes dispositive if everything else flows
through it.
And

so

I think,

right to an interlocutory

in this

claim

of a

appeal, while they may

file it, I don't believe it's provident, and I
believe it's just another delaying tactic to
defendant in custody longer than

keep

absolutely

necessary.
THE COURT:

Alright, anything

further

from the State?
MS.

CRANDALL:

Other than, Your Honor,

to say this is a delaying tactic to keep the
defendant in custody is highly offensive.

This is

the first we've heard of even them saying that

they

wanted to waive the jury trial was this morning.
It hasn't even been brought up.
snow-balled with it.

We're just kind of

It's up to the Court of

Appeals to decide whether or not the

interlocutory

appeal is appropriate and if Your Honor's

decision

is appropriate, and we have the right to request
that .
THE COURT:
do,

Alright. What we're going to

we will recess until tomorrow morning at

I intend to proceed with the trial at 8:30,

THACKERjCO
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directs

morning.

Your

COURT:
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you.
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MR.
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or M r .

findings
would

and

an

you need

order

to

do

that?
MR.
the

audio

can

get

RETALLICK:

tape, Your

If we

Honor,

it done p r o b a b l y
MR. A R R I N G T O N :

this

tape

of the

would

day

General's

be to

in order

Your

Honor.

probably

done

by

THE
Have

for b o t h

Attorney's
we'll

we

of the

Honor,

contact

the

day.

obviously,

it done b e f o r e

RETALLICK:

minutes,

mail

of this p r o c e e d i n g ,
end

get

the

end

Attorney

Office.
MR.

order.

of

Your

get

to

a copy

by the

can

the

Office

expect

It's

that

10:30.

Alright.

submitted.
Court,
would
by
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We'll be in recess.
MS.
so

CRANDALL:

Your Honor, maybe, just

we can track where we're at, if we could have a

Court hearing maybe later this afternoon.
make sure we have those written rulings

We

can

and, I

think, at that point, we'll be able to--maybe

we

can give Your Honor the State's better position
far as the Attorney General's Office and Court
Appeals would say on the matter.
there's any objection to that.
THE COURT:
it by phone.

Mr.

of

I don't know if
I think--

Well, I suppose we could do

Mr. Retallick has to return to Ogden

to get that done, and Mr. Arrington to North
Lake.

as

Salt

So what is your preference, Mr. Arrington or

Retallick?
MS.

CRANDALL:

A phone conference

is

f ine .
MR. ARRINGTON:

Telephone

conference.

MR. RETALLICK:

Telephone

conference

XI C ,

-L^U-L

HUilUl

THE COURT:

•

Alright.

We will plan on a

telephone conference at 1:30 then.
MR. RETALLICK:

Very good, Your Honor.

MR. ARRINGTON:

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

THACKERiCO
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Than k you .
MR. ARRINGTON:

THACKERrCO
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FILED
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
State of Utah,
Petitioner,
Case No. 20100632-SC

v.
Jamie Lynn Greenwood,
Respondent.

ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Petition for Permission
to Appeal Interlocutory Order filed by the State of Utah,
accompanied by a Petition for Emergency Relief Pursuant to Rule
8A of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Court grants a
provisional stay of the district court proceedings to afford this
Court the time necessary to consider the Petitions.
FOR THE COURT:

<6M-ic>
Date

Matthew B. Durrant
Associate Chief Justice

0000121

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
00O00

SEP 2 7 2010

ATTORNEY GENERAL
SEP 2 8 2010

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Petitioner,

APPEALS
Case No. 20100632-SC

V,

Jamie Lynn Greenwood,
Defendant and Respondent

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for
Permission to Appeal an Interlocutory Order, filed on August 4,
2010.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Permission to Appeal an
Interlocutory Order is granted.

For The Court:

'-%n-iO
Date

s

^.Matl£hew B. D u r r a n t
Associate Chief Justice

